THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE

Husserl's intuitionism represents a real step ahead, as by the essential structure and, by the realization of the noetic–noematic level, he somehow succeeded in accounting for the world of objects. He may have therefore pretended, through Fink's writings, that in a certain sense, his transcendental subjective idealism is a real explanation of the "origin of the world", but the split consciousness in the essence correlation, at the noetic–noematic level, was nevertheless historically inadequate, as it could not account for the historic order in any way. The phenomenological reduction was not only inadequate to history, but it also represented an explicit renunciation to historical order, which did not prevent Husserl, who had created the world in an exclusively transcendental way, from bitterly criticizing the rationalist-physicalism (in *Krisis* from *Phylosophia*) as it does not represent an adequate scientific solution. It was the interference of two kinds of reality orders, proving the flimsiness of the whole transcendental subjective idealism, which is actually nothing but the dialectical approach of essence.

Reality shows that history is not a chaos of essences, infinitely and unreasonably superposed, according to a consciousness which can not turn from historical to transcendental. It is only the abuse of transcendentalization that could create the idealistic illusion, which can under no circumstance and in no way justify historic order. A transcendental consciousness may create history, but this consciousness seems to be absent, exterior to historic order, and therefore idealism is a disguised "naturalism". But history has its essential dimension, which is necessity. Everything happening in history bears the sign of necessity, which determines the order of the concrete and constitutes, by its engraving upon substance, the order of values. A philosophy that does not take necessity into account, however ingenious it may be, is doomed. Whatever can be said of its existence is bound to be said but under the historic condition. That is, we can not initially assert that there is more order than a millenium of existence shows; all we can try to show is what sense and what signification this order of the concrete has, through a perpetual attempt at being adequate, which is the substantialist technique.

We have permanently avoided the assumption that substance is a philosophical conception of the world, as this would be false, we, too would be guilty of that mutilation of the concrete we were talking about. Substance is the very principle of history, its marrow, so to say, and the entire historical structure is a structure only in as much as it takes part in the substance. In this sense, the science of substance is turned towards itself and the method required by this return is no longer a fixed, automatic rule, as substance is, at the same time, an unforeseeable formation. However we may try to avoid anticipations, this time we find that a minimum of indications on the substance itself is unavoidable.

The substantial sense, due to the complexity of the concrete, and also because of the antinomy, through the turning of the substantial structure (the substantial culture) towards itself and towards the means if its own formation – as much as the antinomy of knowledge allows it in the act of knowing – is extremely difficult to examine.

There is an axis necessity – *nous*[1] , which is both present and past at the same time, since time is the fourth dimension of the concrete. The space that was initially present is still here, and hierarchically, what was less present still has peripherally less presence, up to the ephemeridaes, which take less place in the concrete, both on the present and "past" line. For the past and the present of the ephemerid are included in the relative present of contemporary life, then of the mineral and physical existence, as this present has a relatively permanent character. It is a present, therefore a duration. One can not say the earth has not a duration of its own, but in its own way, it lasts longer, it is present for a longer time than life. So, there is a gradual density of duration, and the wider it is, the more rarified, so to say. The spatial width is added a time dimension, which we have intuitively analyzed here; modern physics has mathematically expressed both space and time as parts of the dimensions of substance. As it appears, substance is not only structure, but, as we will see, it will achieve a merging of the type space-time. The axis past and the axis space overlap and, at the same time, constitute an axial structure, which is substance in itself. But the axis necessity – noos itself is not independent from the substance, as the growing axis of a tree is not independent from the tree, i.e. from the very sap of the tree. The tree is a creation of its own sap, the germinative principle flowing through it and producing flowers. All the substance has passed through the trunk of the tree and is what it has become, what it is *tomorrow*. But then, the tree is no longer a creation, it is a participation to substance, the germ is both creation and the permanent present, it multiplies like fire, without wasting itself. Forever present, the germ is on the axis, the depth not being considered on the physical-support dimension, but on the substantial dimension, towards the noosic inner principle, which is given in the present. The substance, analogue to and deeper than the germinal is a permanent present, and therefore, advancing towards the substance, we go towards what is present, but the present itself is made of some sort of successive "emboîtements"[2] of ever more substan-

tial structures, and when reaching the theoretic point noos, it is in fact a horizontal thrust, which represents the substantial direction. The substance itself appears as a horizontal plan, where the searching genetism finds nothing but an inscription of the peripheral. The past and the present periphery make up a fringe of structures around the ever more essential structures of the substance. On the other hand, due to the fact that material forms have a more durable present, that, so to say, time devours them more slowly, a new structure is being drawn, whose framework is both old, with respect to history, past and life and yet present. It is a special structure, exhibiting the vital and cultural collections (genetics) already turned into a physically durable present. (The earth comprises in its present most of the remnants of the past lives as well.) So, physical matter wraps the substance from the past till the present periphery. Substance can only be transmitted through structure, and the most advanced form is objective knowledge, which also implies, if it is substantial, a minimum of physical, historical support, belonging to destruction, and a something which is also structurally transformed, similar to the germ that produces another germ, more alive than the former has become. But this very correlation is an antinomy, because the substance-germ is half developed somatically in culture, in order to ensure a transmission body for the substance. One can therefore conceive as substance, the principle which is in fact, the noos, with a minimum of living support, as the genes or the chromosome could be called substance, but an even "more substantial" reality with respect to man. The difficulty in conception comes from the fact that, under an individual form, substance is life, which is a tiny structural germ support, whereas within the structure, the support is enlarged and made of ever wider circles, of collectivity support. But substance can not give up its own support, which is creation of the substantial body order, and which, therefore, takes its structural shape: universal matter, germinal individuation. Not only that. *Substantial knowledge* is a return to history and starting from the periphery (physics, etc.) the closer it gets to life the more substantial it gets, growing further on in collectivity and turning towards itself in ortholo-gy and the theory of the substance. In other words, objective knowledge is the moment of substance itself, that has become even more substantial when turned towards itself, in an action which we called transcendental, but contrary to transcendental idealism, which is an ignored naturalism, the substantial transcendental traverses the historic moment.

Thus, analytically speaking, we achieve, only for the sake of explanation, on the one hand the unification of space and time, similar to the concept of modern physics, where the axis of the past is merged with the axis of the present in the structure of substance, and on the other hand, the unification of knowledge structure with its substance, in the same concrete formula in which form merges with structural background. Thus, we find within substance whatever leads to the false problems of philosophy, if abstractly taken into consideration. In this sense, substance is the structure that is transmitted, turned towards itself, for there is history in whatever is being transmitted. In

its turn, the history on the past axis is merged with the existence in space, within substantial reality. Of course, there are residues of the substantial support in formation, but they are incorporated into space, in a certain degradation, when not used as elements of substantial hierarchy. Similarly, whatever used to be living in the species is also present, the rest to be incorporated by the matter, acquiring a presence of a different degree, to put it straight, a degraded presence.

The axis of the substantial body is fiction, as actually the whole past is, for what is this past, which is present in its most substantial aspects, and pure nothingness in its most essential? What does the past of a species mean, actually? A successive abandonment of material, which is finally returned to matter as it was borrowed. What is the past of the organism that receives matter and eliminates matter ? What is the past of water waves if not water ? Or what is the past of the printing press ? The paper it used, which one day becomes paper again? Or is it the past of that machine itself ? But we thus enter a series of infinite regressions, and "infinite" means another unification.

In this sense, the space and time are unified within the concept space-time. The present-past in history, the past species within today's species (for what is lost means nothing but the matter lent to matter) and so on, up to the dimension of knowledge unified with the dimension of substantial history, with substance itself, finally.

This would be the analysis of the concrete – substance within history, for substance is like a meeting of real history along the present, substantial axis with the center of knowledge along the present, spatial axis, whereas the concept of substance in old philosophy was dialectic, deductive, like a pseudo-structure. It is an analysis not of the concept, not even of perigeal experience, but a maximum of apogeal experience, a concrete consideration of history along all its dimensions, the very palpable experience.

What is worth remembering is the unique mode of structure and substantial formation during its return to the concrete, which also serves as nutriment for its own formation. It is a sort of order, unique in its own way, which, without the rigidity of rationalist perfection, constitutes at the same time a solid guarantee of knowledge.

To give up such a necessary order is an attitude as dialectical as the other one, which states the existence of a perfectly logical order in the world. For knowing this order, we have to face it in an indefinitely adequate act of thinking, in which we are given nothing but the rational, as it is given, i.e. in an absolute way, but which surpasses the absolute adequate datum through the judgement of significations. The criterion of significations itself is given by the necessary reality. Over evaluating the perspectives of such a trial is as groundless as underestimating them.

If this perpetual attempt of adaptation, i.e. of prolonging the significations of essence necessity can be called a method, then we accept, for the procedure it imposes to us the name of substantial method. But since its accent lies

on the attempt at integration, the best word would be reintegration of essences in the necessity of the concrete. This reintegration means the identification of significations with an infinitely deep dimension, a dimension of necessity, leading to the end of history. Defining it would be including it in the structure of substance, and its order constitutes the criterion of substantial values and, in this sense, the preoccupation for the signification and the substantial hierarchy of significations constitutes, what we would call, the basics of the suggested method. This method is historically conditioned, and it is worth as much as it can borrow in terms of value from historic evidence, i.e. no less than the amount of concrete thinking it contains, being indefinitely subject to all verifications. It may seem that under the circumstances, it is not so reliable and the word method is improper for a means of knowing which so openly accepts all risks. It is obvious that, as compared to dialectic methods, it is indeed aiming low, but it will be equally clear that giving up the illusive advantages of dialectics means in fact a serious consolidation, for it eliminates countless causes of error. The lack of trust in this method comes from mistrusting concrete thinking, as a result of an insufficient appreciation of its contents and value; it is also due to the fact that no one has made yet an analysis of concrete history, with sufficient insight to allow substantial intuitions, which are the only ones that lead, through significations, to integrating the structure of the concrete. This is not the place to analyze the signification itself, although the absence of this analysis is the cause of the crisis in the so-called modern culture [...].

What is being given in essence is given absolutely, and no future interpretation, no future integration, no relativization can change this absolute. Those who understand this statement properly, will understand one of the causes of the endless hesitations in science and philosophy, due particularly to the never ending panic that whatever may seem certain today might one day look less certain, hence the ever keener and more disorderly rush for certitude. On the contrary, skepticism, never knowing where to stop, cannot realize that the absolute of essences is a certitude escaping the game of relativity. The truth is that the greatest difficulty is that human mind realize which is the reality given in an absolute way, in essences, and which is a simple self-suggestion of interference of interpretations. None of all the possible theories in the world will ever be able to change this absolute datum that the sun is in the sky, as seen from the earth, going from east to west, as neither will they be able to abolish the truths discovered by the simplest of sciences, not by its own method, but by lucky essential intuitions in an apogeal experiment.

On the other hand, the value of any adequate act of thinking, coming from its substantial character, i.e. from the concrete significations it has identified, appears different from, and enhanced by, what it has given in essential intuitions. It tries to realize new absolute dimensions, to be integrated in substantial intuitions, under the terms in which they are being given. This is what constitutes the scientific material in the most common sense, and what

forms the pride of positive science, but obviously, there being no reason for restricting ourselves to the results of physics and chemistry.

Here comes up another constitutive imperative of the concrete method, the way we understand it, i.e. that authentic direction, of the transcendental noosic tendency, which decides upon the value of any scientific success. This imperative clearly wipes out the tendencies of pragmatism, which turns success into a proof of truth, and its very mistake is the argument of our assertion. A scientific theory cannot be true just because it gives satisfaction, even if this happened in numerous instances. Almost on the contrary, there is often a reason here for slipping into error, for if success is in a wrong direction, science will sink into error in geometric progression. It is the case of pragmatism and of the materialist science, which, after a few initial real successes, have dialectically developed along lines which we will call subspecies, as will be seen. It is the very fact that not any case of dissatisfaction abolishes a substantial theory, as many successful cases did not bring any satisfaction either, that the unique character of the substantial method lies in; it consists of an indefinite adaptation to a datum outside it, in substantial intuitions, but at the same time, to a datum inside it, which constitutes its own criterion. Maintaining scientific thinking in a permanent adaptation to a necessary reality is not that difficult when this necessary reality is homogenous and relatively exterior, also having a considerable duration, such as the essences in physics and chemistry. On the other hand, unbelievable difficulties arise when it comes to a complex necessary reality, whose formation seems to be perpetually unstable, such as the vital and noosic reality, for the return of substance towards itself, in ever more undetermined areas, imposes equations, highly unstable in themselves. What we meant to hastily point out here was only the fact that the orientation of some interpretations plays a decisive role as a criterion in judging the results we obtain. The main problem here is to discern the absolute data from the significant ones, for the universal tendency, not only of people in general, but particularly of scientists, is to prolong, out of a natural carelessness, the absolute essential data into meanings which, although seemingly necessary developments, are in fact dialectical, misleading evolutions.

Another characteristic of the method is the consideration of historic reality in its entireness, showing no mutilating preconception, examining concrete essences and significations, not elements, even if, within the biological condition and the categories of individuality, an analysis of special and temporal succession will be required. Essences are not static fragments, they are not acts of articulation for the noos and biological spontaneity, with a specific simultaneous character of uniqueness and unity, for they are subordinated to the involution tendencies and the transcendental organizing poles. Concrete essences are not static, they are indefinitely mobile and dynamic, being organized by certain structural poles according to certain structural directions, but we will deal again with these structures only in particular chapters.

The concrete reality of the substantial horizon contains such a complex fragment of the essence of wholeness, that one should consider the enormous mistake that has been made when this reality was mutilated because of various preconceived ideas. In a certain way, this reality, which is also the only source of knowledge is substantial, as it is actually part of the substance in itself. We have therefore all the reasons to believe and we hope to convince that the value of certitude of its structure is considerable, or in real terms it is substantial.

The essential condition of any scientific examination is the condition of indefinite adequacy of thinking to substantial reality, for necessity is, historically, one of the dimensions of substance.

This helps us return to the critic examination of certitude offered by the substantialist method, meant to replace the perfect certitude of dialectics.

It is a certitude based on essence, so, as Husserl pointed out, a certitude of evidence. Yet, through a substantial transfer, it becomes the concrete thinking of significations, solved in a substantial intuition. All these means of substantiation aim at indefinitely increasing the value of certitude, without ever touching the limit of dialectics, and neither that of the pure noos, which would mean turning substance into noos, and would surpass history, remaining, so to say, a substantial certitude. Therefore, the substantialist method observes the condition of substantiality, its inscription being one of value-hierarchy, that is of historic order, and all its approaches are "conditioned" by substantiality, in an indefinite hierarchical progression. Practical and dialectical are half-certitudes, without being statistical, as modern physics considers them.

The fact that the Danube will keep on flowing tomorrow is a highly probable certitude, but not a statistic probability one, for the existence of this certitude is not due to a hazardous calculation, decided by a majority. In a majority, the decision is taken by the slight automatic shift of an indifferent, anonymous, homogenous figure, while substantial probability is a structural one, namely given within the concrete. Waiting can sometimes be statistical, but it is an act of spontaneity, by its dialectical essence. Substantial probability is not mathematically but organically conditioned. For this child, born half an hour ago, to stop growing, certain concrete events must happen and when I say that their probability is maximum or minimum, that is I say that only ninety per cent of children get to be 30, I can not do it as if it were a roulette, placing the names of one hundred children into a cap and trying to pick the ten ones who will not get to be 30. It is a certitude that comes from the concrete necessity, and the percentage can be accepted under the historic condition, but this condition is totally different from the statistic one.

The organic character of the concrete imposes here a short anticipation of the orthogenesis; as a matter of fact, such anticipations are unavoidable as a result of the very antonymic idea of the method, which is, at the same time, both the principle of knowing outside the object of knowledge, and a part of this very object of knowledge, since it has to be known, explained, presented.

This anticipation regards first the structure of the concrete itself, which is not given in a certain duration, vaguely shaping things, as Bergson sees it, but in its devolution zone, in a substantial structure. In the evolution zone, it is given in a quantitatively indefinite structure of cycles of energy, life and noosic activity. These cycles are at the same time under the sign of the hazard and necessity (we will see later from what standpoints), but also under the noosic sign of life and presence, everything in an equally certain, but unstable hierarchy, in an indefinite conjugation, in a flow that sometimes can be taken as time itself. As we could see, towards of this duration, philosophers have had so far two kinds of attitudes; they have either given up what was indefinitely flowing, imposing the rigid categories of the concept, or, on the contrary, they have admitted they were disarmed in front of the instability, declaring it ungraspable (or at most in a vaguely intuitive way, impossible to express). Other two attitudes represent common sense and modern science, both pragmatic, which did not really bother with the ineffable of the duration and one cannot say that they failed in their attempts, with some reserves for science, whose ambitions were sometimes excessive. In front of them all, there stands knowledge acquired by essential and substantial intuitions, having as its basis the fact that history, in the dialectical zone is given in cycles (and here we find another antinomy of the cycle with respect to the possibility of isolating it, which will surely be dealt with further on) and that, in essential intuition, knowledge is absolute, but mentioning that it is spontaneous [...].

It is not in suspending judgement that the essence of objectivity lies, but avoiding the subjective reasons in judgement, which is something completely different and a sense which science, betrayed by the scientific spirit, will have to rediscover.

"To understand" in the concrete meaning is to mark the essential intuitions and then reintegrate them in the structure of substantial intuitions, turning them into the criterion of truth. It is not an understanding proper, but an adequate construction, the adequacy being conditioned by the possibilities of integration and unification within the necessary reality of the two kinds of intuition.

What does "understanding" mean in dialectics ?

To admit (to impose, to settle) a principle (outside comprehension) and to find then the logical deductions which do not contradict it. It takes a vague relation with concrete existence, like a futile coquetry of truthfulness with the truth of essential intuitions.

The criterion was there strict concatenation and here the adequacy to the data of essential intuition and then to the substantial one.

To think correctly is to think only in the presence of the concrete, i.e. under the condition of the necessity pole; it is to indefinitely maintain, without a stop, within a rigorous presence, the noosic pole and the structure of the concrete, knowing that the less rigorous the presence, the weaker the rational character of this concrete.

An everlasting presence, also obtained by the transfer of the concrete substantiality, but endless presence – here is the condition of an adequate method.

In the indefinite center of transfers, the noosic presence is like the control of a bank account – here is the consistent condition of the concrete method.

Whatever is received with no immediate cover, is received only temporarily, and nothing, at any rate, can prevail over *the concrete presence*, which, as an essential structure of essences, is the absolute criterion, but only in the terms it is being given.

A type of thinking subordinated to necessity, ready for all the surprises of necessity, never invoking any logical criterion in front of necessary reality, giving up imposing its own laws to a concrete which implies and surpasses it, having as a last instance nothing but the instance of noosic evidence, in as much as evidence can be verified, and being unable to invoke any final signification labeling – this is the historic condition of the substantialist concrete method.

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWING

[...] A proof that vision surpasses perception is the very character of dreams, which are so intensely real, colorful and rich that they exceed any possible description. I know that this structural richness of dreams is suspect; it may be a vague illusion, because of the equations implied by the dramatic character of dreams. Most people find it hard to retell what the supposed richness of the vision consisted in. I am perfectly aware of the amount of truth included in this objection from my literary experience. Works of a naïve simplicity sometimes seem to their authors and to their devoted, of a touching richness. I think I am entitled to say that I still realize, with an acceptable lucidity, the content of my dreams, which sometimes are characterized by a lucidity surpassing the normal one. Emotions have always enhanced my lucidity and during the war I kept it even during attacks. It is the same thing in dreams. I can say that in childhood I had dreams of a line and color complexity, which surpasses any imaginative attempt, when I am awake. As a matter of fact, I still remember dozens of such dreams, because their impression is stronger than the memory of most of my life events. Actually, there were two alternating variants of dreams in my childhood: a dream of a heavenly beauty and some two infernal ones, so to say. The heavenly one was the vision of suspended gardens and lakes, with immense pools out of which huge jets were springing up, with numberless graciously laced kiosks, everything so rich in color, line and watery shimmer that never could I render in description. Another dream, one of the infernal ones, was a vision of clay pits, deeper than the mortar ones, filled with snakes, as thick as a human arm,

so numerous that they were entangled, those awake squirming among the rolls of the sleeping ones. These pits were stretching to a horizon, which was larger than that of normal view, but beneath a lead sky. In fact, I would like to return one day to this special perspective. It was, and it still is in today's dreams, an oversized perspective and, I suppose, an accented one in its reality, through the emotive substratum. I have thus seen some of the highest mountains of Europe. Never have they seemed to me as high as a mountain in my dream. Particularly, I had the vision of a landscape in Turkestan, dominated by a dome-like mountain, rising to an amazing height, and up there, in a disproportion of data, an even more impressive relation was created. People that could hardly be seen, but who were yet visible, were standing by some huge gallows poles, bowed like candle-arches, but so high that – now, awake, relating everything to real facts – I could say they were dozens of times higher than the Eiffel Tower seems to be (together with the tower-like mountain, they must have been, in that perspective, 10 thousand meters high). All this modification of proportions, giving my dream a hallucinating intensity, was coming, I think, from the very excess of details, from the richness of its structure. Normally, the heights of a mountain are getting dim. If it still rose to nearly the zenith, although its foot was only a couple of kilometers away, marked by the road, lined with houses and gardens, (the trees in the perspective) it means that there was so much richness of structure that turned it intense. We probably should take into account the fact that, in a dream, since one can move instantaneously, the perspective is different from the real one. So, returning to the object of our discussion, it is beyond any doubt that one cannot condition the intensity and structural richness of intuitive vision on perception, i.e. of a collaboration of our thinking. It depends on the initial intensity of vision, which, in its turn, is favored by a really sensitive recording of structurally rich images.

Another argument in favor of this dissociation might be, in our opinion, the fact that the most vivid details are connected with youth, *when perception is weaker*, but when *intuitions are stronger* and the recordings are being made with a fresher sensitive substance. It goes the same with the visions in a state of being awake.

The difference between image and perception is particularly important, as *the difference between thinking and the noosic knowledge* – the intuitive one – by no means a logical knowledge – *is capital for the problems we are dealing with*. On the other hand, in art, they often debate the problem whether the uninitiated ones have the same vision as the artist, but it is just that they cannot express their opinion on one thesis or another. They only have the illusion they possess the same sensitivity as the artist. What we can say for the time being is that sensitivity has to be separated from perception, and most of all, from expression. As to the thesis under consideration, we consider it at least obvious that the artist has a richer vision than he can express (which is no justification for mediocre artists, who simulate a sensitivity, which they do not have, in a specifically excessive expression). At the

same time, the artist seems to have a more real sensitivity, as proved by the reviews of some "great" critics which enrich, willingly it's true, the mediocre authors and impoverish the important ones. Part of the public has, probably, a poor noosic vision, but it is completed by the spontaneity of their thinking and *dialectical* memory, as we will see further on.

What we are interested in here, was to establish the absolute reality of the knowing noosic pole, irrespective of the disturbance introduced in this equation by the subjective ego; this disturbance will be the object of other studies [...].

NOOSIC TRANSFER

The essence of any expression is the intention to introduce within the horizon of the interlocutor's essential intuition a part of what is given in one's own horizon of essential intuitions. It is, in other words, a transfer of structural presence. *The possibility of such a transfer is the perigeal form of the apogeal transfer of structural presence, which, in the old sense, is culture itself, and in a modified sense, substance itself.* The degree to which this objectification in expression has been successful upon all concrete coordinates, represents, in a way, the history of humanity itself, from the experiences among individuals and up to the experiences of the great cultures. The degree of objectification depends on the degree of noosic representation of the sign, which can evolve from a copy to a formula allowing reproduction, or to an indication that can only be guessed. But the essence of the copy appears in the very indication, because the law of the symbol and of the indication leads to a structural reconstruction of the original. The form of the possibility of reproduction varies from a vague comparison, from metaphor, to scientific measurement. *The postulate of objectification requires nothing but the possibility of achieving a mental reproduction.*

When this intention of structural reconstitution of a presence, i.e. of a necessary, correctly thought reality, is shaped in a durable material, and (obviously not always in a perigeal form) aiming at surpassing a "conversation" between two subjectivities, when, in an apogeal form, there is a manifest intention of objectifying for a collectivity, no matter how large, and for a time span beyond life's limits, then, we are in the presence of ortologic modalities, which we are going to particularly deal with.

The noosic tendency of objectification is manifest in biology, in the same way in which the noosic tendencies are manifest in dialectical forms, through an instinct. It is an *objectification instinct,* an instinct of consciousness perpetuance through artistic creation, which is to be met along the whole historic scale, under the biologic condition.

Orthology, as objectification of concrete thinking, is therefore adequated twice. First, we have an adequacy of thinking to the necessary reality and

then an adequacy of expression to the concrete thinking. Which could be understood as the forms of an achieved intention. This is an extremely difficult rule, making orthology the most characteristic operation of noosic devolution. In orthology, for a real objectification, we do not need just a certain precision, but a double, conjugated one. It is because of these difficulties that the so called human culture has seldom realized this ortologic objectification. It only succeeded where isolation allowed measurement, and measuring allowed the precision of concrete thinking and, at the same time, the precision of the expression. The orthologic "sciences" are, to a certain extent, what we call exact sciences. But this (yet relative and probabilistic) "exactness" is only possible in the field of physics and mathematics, because the spontaneity of the making introduces a law-preciseness, as in astronomy where the simplicity and the size of star movement gives the impression of precision. But it goes without saying that knowledge cannot be stopped to what the intuitionist philosophers call, somehow contemptuously, a "rationalist physicalism". The ambition of science has always been to surpass the field of physics and chemistry, and if it contented itself to stick to the field where quantification is possible, this was indeed done, in the beginning, out of the illusion that everything can be quantified, and later on when this illusion was no longer possible, it simply resigned itself.

If science got stuck here, this happened, in our opinion, because it has ignored its own essence, which is orthology. Science is nothing but a chapter of ortology, and it is only the orthologic integration of science that can break – we will see in what conditions – the deadlock.

Retracing the way of science and considering it as what is "known", let us see what its essence is.

All that is "known" represents a totality of expressions referring to a necessary content, i.e. to primary knowledge acts that have been expressed. As the expression – language is the essence of objectification, this process of objectification has to be watched in its evolution, as ortology is based on it.

The word, in spite of its facilities, is not a sure means of objectification, as it always has to be connected to its essence and it is worth as much as its contact with these concrete essences. As soon as the concrete essence disappears, we imperatively need a direct reference to it, a contact, however far it may be.

This contact, fundamental to objectification and therefore to ortology, (and implicitly to science) is, as we have said, the contact through *comparison*. Comparison is, by the creation of a system of reciprocal references, the beginning and the essence of objectification, for these essences allow the reconstitution of the primary structural presence.

We suspect that in the perigeal zone of indetermination – as a primitive form of comparison – there was the metaphor. The language of primitive peoples seems to be entirely metaphoric.

Later on, when counting appeared, it being an infinitely more precise comparison, and when the measuring based on number was used, the progress of objectification must have been quite important. Actually, this

measurement has been for centuries a numeric and metaphoric compromise: "as tall as a man", "a foot", "as a thumb".

Leaving aside the whole period of antiquity and Middle Ages, we will find, in modern times, the achievement of apogeal experience. Comparatively, counting evolved into quantitative science and descriptive, metaphoric comparison into art, in the proper sense of the word.

We will talk in due time and in adequate books about the significance of quantified science, as well as that of art. But it has already been established here that they are two forms of ortology, a separate field from the problem of knowledge itself.

In trying to correct millenium-lasting mistakes, we mean by art, science and technique not forms opposed to knowledge, but different ortologic means of the entireness of the known concrete.

The act of knowledge at their basis is the same, they observe the same law of knowing, they are applied to the same field, but they constitute different systems of expression. Leonardo da Vinci is, from this point of view, a real representative.

The act of knowing is a primary contact with the concrete and is the act of a genius. The other people only have a practical contact with the concrete, lacking the primary noosic light, and being deformed by what Bacon would call "idola mentes", more exactly, by the genetic subjectivity of thinking spontaneity. In this case, the spontaneity of the language is at the same time both the greatest cause of error, and one of the practical means allowing social life, where, in fact, it brings about most dramas. Geniuses have knowledge, people have knowing.

One cannot deny the fact that for 2500 years now, since Socrates, the inventor of dialectic thinking, and Plato, there have been numberless confusions. They come from the fact that no one has noticed so far the fundamental difference between concrete and dialectic activity, between concrete and dialectic thinking, between the concrete and dialectic expression and particularly because the sense of objectification has not been gone deeply into, so that it be then followed by the sense of ortology and substance. The sophists had raised a problem, which Greek philosophy found a pseudo-solution to and modern science just a fragment of a solution.

ORTHOLOGY I

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE, ORTHOLOGY AND SUBSTANCE

Had the act of knowledge remained purely subjective the noos had not had any possibility of emancipation. Subjective uniqueness is most provisional, and perishing. The noos resists subjective uniqueness by the series reproduction of the species, compensating individuality by the multiplication of each moment along the substantial line that becomes type of species.

The subjectivity of knowledge tries to overcome it by its reproduction in as many copies as possible, but this is an automatic dialectical reproduction, allowing no progress. Even within the act of knowing, which, liminally, is an act of object-making, the noos could not remain on the *individual horizon*. This is a reduced horizon and its relation with the concrete is al most a ratio of 1 to infinite. The individual horizon had to be surpassed, and it was, on the *social horizon*, where, historically, the passage from object-making to objectification is achieved. This passage depends on communicativeness, which, could not have been done without the transmission – *horizon transfer*. In their turn, communicativeness and logic, imply the objectification with an essential minimum in the expressiveness of the language, if we stick to this concrete series, i.e. to communicativeness, adequated through objectification-orthology.

Even so, it was too little on the conjugated plans. The social horizon was too narrow, and by its source lacking a signification, as the function time is capital and then the *substantial horizon* has been obtained, using the dimension time, which thus becomes a dimension of the *substantial knowledge*, i.e. *of the concrete, ortognosic thinking*, (all of them concretely valent under the condition of indetermination).

The social horizon was already a fulfilling of the space, as geographic extension was implied, meaning the very penetration in all the senses of the concrete. As a result, the social horizon and the devolutionary historical horizon are the historic dimensions in which knowledge that has become substance is being created, and which surpasses them. In other words, we are dealing with some knowledge *verified through the social and historical horizons*. But it is not this verification that gives it the title of substance, although it is the historic form of substantial knowledge. The title of substantiality is given by the degree of knowledge signification, i.e. it is a title of noosic polarization. The degree to which the axial and constitutive dimensions of devolutions are attained is the degree to which knowing tends to become substantial knowledge. The character of substantial organicism comes from this surpassing of the evolutional area and attaining the devolutionary noosic axis.

But, on the other hand, this kind of knowledge is in itself a part of the concrete, one of the superior devolutionary stages, so that when knowledge attains this inner zone, which is substance itself, it is, in fact, substance itself. Therefore, if, indeed, knowledge turned towards its own mystery, we would have a sort of pole of substantiality. Anyway, it has been established that there is a peripheral, concrete knowledge and a substantial one, characterized by plenitude.

But these dimensions correspond to a certain power of objectification of the expression, which is in itself, in case of achievement, a substantial formation, substantial orthology, i.e. substance.

In other words, orthology has not only the substantial dimension, but also the dimension of objectification, for all the noosic pole and the subject do is

to substantially incorporate what has been communicated and to the extent it has been communicated. So, the modality of objectification is part of the essence of substance and orthology ought to have all these dimensions in order to be substantial, to say nothing of the double adequateness of objectification and expression.

When it is not substantial, orthology finds itself mostly in an area of indetermination, along one of the dimensions mentioned above or along all of them at the same time, i.e. in the dimension of concrete thinking (i.e. of significations), or in the historic dimension, or on both, at an interference point and through its concrete essence it is simply logos. The category of this modality of indetermination is the minimum of knowledge and expression that makes up the intellectual activity of the ordinary man, in a usual intellectual life. When analyzing the modalities of object-making and objectification, we will be able to notice that any man achieves each day – in a mixed way – a minimum of art, science, techniques, whose significations are, yet, reduced. It is only when these modalities enter the zone of substantial polarity and to the degree they touch this zone, that they deserve being considered chapters of orthology. We have to point out that we mean by that substantial ortology, which, in its turn, just on the line, is substance itself, for not anyone adding up correctly three apples and four apples is a scientist.

We will show at length some other time, what is, in the act of objectification, the correlation between the noosic intention and the instinct of affirmation through expression, through the *manifestation* of the individual. But it is already clear that *the instinct of expression and affirmation* of subjectivity is a means, as it is the entire biological ego, appearing as a biologic motive of culture, such as does the perpetuation instinct with respect to orthogenesis. Collective subjectivity is no exception to this condition.

THE ORTHOLOGY OF CONCRETE THINKING

Like any adequate activity, orthology is in a permanent contact with the concrete, as it has to objectify the concrete given in thinking and, for each particular situation, it looks for an adequate modality. Any means of surpassing subjectivity in an objectifying process is therefore welcome and these modalities are in fact undeterminable through their historic hybridization. Yet, we can find some axes of substantiality, namely in the *artistic, scientific* and *technical* modalities. In all these modalities, the grounds of objectification and expression is comparison in its various concrete implications, under the condition of the resumed motive.

In other words, the concrete can be objectified in three different structural modes, which are not completely equivalent, but they all use the same means of objectification, that is the *comparative structure*.

It is firstly the modality of essential subordination of symbols, which constitutes the scientific *objectification*, mistaken by epistemologists for scientific knowledge, which is a nonsense, leading to a philosophical deadlock. What one normally means by science is simply a modality of objectification and Husserl, who created phenomenology as a general science of essences, yet ignored this essential condition , which lead him to his idealist deadlock.

The other modality is the *artistic modality*, i.e. the modality that tends to a corporal, total and concrete objectification.

Finally, besides the modality within the zone of indetermination, another substantial series is the *technical modality of the expression*, whose essence consists in stating that the acts of an ego express it. It should be pointed out that this modality is the least adequated to necessary reality, yet its expressivity is sometimes outstanding, for instance the pyramids of Egypt or St. Bartholomew's Night – for it creates by itself moments of necessary reality. In a certain sense, the technical modality is first expression and indirectly objectification.

I have mentioned that each of these modalities has its diagram of adequacy and one can say that their intensive accents do not coincide. The scientific modality achieves a maximum of objectification in the field of physics and chemistry. Here, by measurement, it achieves the number index of the respective concrete, with such a great adequacy that these indices are enough to achieve the respective essences again, any time and any place (under the noosic condition) being even able to "foresee" future, substantially superficial phenomena.

The higher essence objectification climbs the historic scale towards the noosic pole, the more difficult to achieve it gets, and even knowledge itself turns extremely difficult. This is because the movement is here from the objective to the subjective, while the expression has to be quite the other way, from the subjective to the objective.

The postulate of objectification and of scientific and artistic expression is to achieve such an objective index that the data of knowledge be reconstituted, irrespective of the subjective conditions in which they were produced. This is at the same time a criterion of orthologic value.

This *objectification index* has in itself an indeterminable number of modalities and degrees of achievement.

While within physics and chemistry it reached a sort of perfection, so that, according to the index, what has once been known can be indefinitely reconstructed by anyone (under the noosic condition), it has different possibilities and another technique in the artistic expression where, its variety is even larger, actually [...].

The reproductive plastic modality is under the condition of the material and only surpasses the physic corporality to the extent to which it achieves a second degree expression, i.e. a transformation pivot: when it reproduces the amount of spirit betrayed by face expressivity and by the gestures of the model.

On the other hand, this is valid for any kind of orthologic modality. It is a revealed objectivity, for the concrete thinking expressed by it is a *revealing index* with respect to the artist's, scientist's or the action man's consciousness, or, as they say, with respect to his personality that indirectly becomes a known motive.

But, anyway, no matter how powerful the revelation of objectivity may be through the plastic modality, the noos has also created other forms of expression, among which, *speech* (the logos) is fundamental. The condition of speech is, naturally, different from the condition of the plastic modality. Speech itself, although one of the fundamental forms of expression, suffers particularly from the condition of subjectivity. Objectification is looking here for an adequate form. It is obtained through the principle of reproduction too, but reproduction takes here particular forms. In the first place, speech, the simple logos is, as I have mentioned, not only a remarkable form of objectification, but also a very useful one, as long as the contact with the currently concrete essences is present. Its objectification is sufficient, no matter how many shortcomings it may lead to.

But unawares, it evolves towards the two forms that will be highly differentiated, in the artistic speech and the scientific expression (under the historic condition). Among them, there are several trends and hybrids. Artistic speech, as well as scientific expression, constitutes a mode of objectification through its capacity of reproduction. The former will evolve towards the metaphor, which is a form of objectification by reproduction, creating a double "emploi"[3] with the plastic form, but with intentionally various means, while the latter will evolve towards the formulation through essential subordination, which allows any reproduction. Later on, artistic speech will turn towards a certain kind of automatic reproduction. But it will not be confused with the dialectical automatic reproduction, which supposes a concrete point of insertion: the metaphor, in the first case, the formula itself, which is in this sense virtually concrete and whose finding is strictly connected to the concrete thinking.

We also remind here that art, science, as well as technique are nothing but modalities of objectification of the *concrete thinking*, which is their ground and common source, and also modalities of the *objectification instinct*.

THE ARTISTIC MODALITIES

Artistic speech has the tendency to resume in its adequate structure not only the plastic modality, but also the technical one, merging them in a complex way, as the motives resumed in a symphony at the scale of each instrument. Actually, it is something specific to history to permanently resume, like a motif, the forms with their evolution line and to intricate them with other evolution lines belonging to different insertion moments, indefinitely

and indeterminably, preserving nothing but the substantial accent. Thus, the modality of the speech resumes not only the plastic reproduction in its metaphoric, often onomatopoeic form, but, in the novel and drama, it resumes the form of objectification through action. The characters of the novel and drama are not only metaphorically described, but they are also objectified through the actions of their objectification instinct and even through their concrete thinking, expressed in speech. Obviously, everything is under the condition of indetermination.

The theatre itself is an even more complex form, *a symphonic structure* in which all the artistic modalities are resumed and implied (the text, the actor's body, the plastic and musical setting, etc.). Commedia dell'Arte even resumes "improvisation" (that is the objectification through the capacity of inspiration).

The motif of objectification appears everywhere as something specific to art (so long as one can speak of specific here); it resumed in an indefinite multitude of modalities, degrees and different implications the objectification impulse, which is some sort of desire to survive within someone else. The motif of objectification is correlated with the deep motif of the substance, which gives values a dimension.

The objectification instinct belongs to social groups and they are the ones that create the cultures of all degrees.

But this does not make artistic experience, in its historic condition, be determined, for there are also other implications resulting from the social modalities, which either borrow for themselves the motif of artistic expression or lend their artistic preoccupation to their specific motif. This is sometimes a religious one (under all forms, having destiny as their main motif), some other times practical (music seems to enhance work capacity) or generally social (circus, any kind of entertainment, etc.).

Artistic intention is permanently present, either as main motif, or as an auxiliary one, or as a background motif. [...]

These implications are not everything. Those that have caused the greatest dissentions are the cenesthetic ones, i.e. under the condition of the biological ego, particularly the concept of *beautiful*. The beautiful has been so much implied in art that most aestheticians consider the beautiful as the constitutive condition of art, while most of the rest find it skillful to solve everything by calling any artistic modality beautiful. It is an elegant way of bypassing the difficulty, yet giving the impression that they have solved it.

In the book dedicated to art in particular we will present all these modalities, at length and with examples, which we can not do here, when dealing with general ortology.

Yet, something that has to be mentioned is that the modality of the speech is for the artistic technique the only to allow a relative objectification of the psychological area, if not even of the sociological or even noological one. (We will be more specific about the terms later, when we will see if, for the

knowledge on the biological ego we can preserve the term of psychology, for the "collective soul" that of sociology, in order to keep the term of noology for the orientation towards the noosic pole.) The motif of comparison is here the *quoted example* after the description has been fluently made.

THE SCIENTIFIC MODALITY

The other modality of objectification is that of the essences in concrete formulae of essences. With remarkable results in the region of the concrete, where the essences are evident and may be isolated, i.e. the essences of physics and chemistry, objectified by means of measuring and leading to books of mathematical and quantitative formulae for each field. Thus, objectification is achieved by *definitions* and *classifications* of quite important essences, in the physic and chemical area of life, i.e. in the area of physical bodies. But it proves inadequate in its actual form for the vital processes themselves, where it cannot provide "perfect" definitions and is restricted to discursive *description*, a mediocre modality, awkward and totally insufficient, a pseudo-objectification, which turns physiology, for instance, into a really vague "science". Husserl's creation of phenomenology is an important contribution to the science of expression through essence formulae, but, if reduced to discursive description, it is far from the desired objectivity. The one way of objectification left here is the example, which sometimes is an excellent means, but it is still quite dangerous, and that is why, all those who use the analytical discursive description avoid it, taking further refuge in subjectivity. Under such circumstances, one cannot speak of a scientific expression and it is not even the case, since some thinkers, ignoring significations, take pride in their "inaccessible" kind of subjective thinking.

Science is the substantialized, systematized expression, as they used to put it, i.e. expressed in such an objective way, that it should allow *at any moment* the duplication of the original experiment, of the concrete thinking.

Science should be able to eliminate and should be aware of what is *negligible* in order to be possible. When astronomers consider the relation of two heavenly bodies, they neglect the other influences of the farther stars, which are *negligible*, though real. The essence of substantiality resides in the structure of these moments of knowledge, i.e. what has to be taken into consideration and what neglected. But allowing this negligence is in itself lucid and structured, as it has to make up a substantial whole with the rest.

We are, therefore, far from a purely formal character of autonomous laws, from the absolute of necessity and universality. That is why, maybe by accepting a compromise, one should use a formula of substantial principle instead of a substantial postulate. If now we know the "laws" of material substance, one shouldn't forget that material substance is just one species of

substance (one instance of substance), which also implies, from the standpoint of nature, the species: vital substance and noological substance.

Putting meanings aside, revealing them as simple implications with respect to the substantial meaning, represents the authentic scientific act of systematized expression.

The actual science is, when compared to authentic science, what instinct is with respect to conscious action. It manages to achieve a lot, but we will have to analyze more closely the analogy, when approaching orthogenesis.

Or, as a blind man who, in his random groping, would make all the movements, both good and false.

Actually, a criticism of actual science will also be made in the chapter on the ontology of the concrete and in that on the substantialist method.

We realize how deep the difference is between authentic science, i.e. the orthologic modality, and the confuse concept of modern philosophical and scientific thinking about science itself, if we notice the bad confusion between concrete thinking and scientific expression. They speak, for instance, about "scientific knowledge", thus mixing up two totally heterogeneous areas of the orthology of the concrete. Knowledge is knowledge and science is science. One can have scientific notions, but not scientific knowledge, as it is commonly but falsely believed, to say nothing of Durkheim's pre-notions. Knowledge is concrete presence, science is systematized expression, as systematized as it can be, but anyway fiduciary, valid as species under the historic condition.

THE OBJECTIFICATION OF THE TECHNIQUE

Objectification through an act is one which, most often, has a very intense expressivity accent, as it is the modality closest to instinct, although it is an inscription that has to be read indirectly, because, being instinctive, it is sometimes expressed without the technical intention of objectification, except for some apogeal instances. The undeterminable variety of acts gives this modality itself an indeterminable number of varieties. From the industrial constructive act (a house, tools) to the most sophisticated apparata, which have transformed the species, from the charity act, and the act of exploration (all the geographical exploration of any kind, like for instance the first flight of a plane, etc.), to the inventions, from religious or political action (of an immense diversity) to the schooling one, from purposely religious, political, etc. monuments and the military commandment to the work of a strictly sportive interest, *all represent an ortologic modality as long as they are inscriptions of concrete thinking*. Some of these actions, particularly if taken alongside with their significations, are often the object of a new inscription, making up a particular discipline, the historic logic. We call it for the time being historic, maybe narrative expression, but we will deal with the subject again further on.

A new inscription of this kind objectifies the rest of the expressions mentioned above, all taken as *acts* and thus having a history of the art, one of the science and another one of the orthology itself. Finally, another form of the *technical* expression is represented by the applied sciences, as well as the *applied "arts"* (such as medicine, engineering, architecture, under certain reserves), taken, here, alongside with their social implications.

[Technical disciplines can be classified only in the corresponding order of orthogenetic insertion, from physics to the technique of substance, but also horizontally, from some machinery or from language to the orthologic encyclopaedia and the artistic technique, from baby care to noocratic politics. In the first cases we have the empiric column, in the middle the traditionally technical one and the last, the technique based on science.

It goes without saying that technical interactions are indefinite as whatever is given can theoretically serve as material for objectification. Art itself is unlimited in its material. But one should notice that the material creates a new classification within the very content of each ortologic modality: literature, drama, sculpture, painting, engraving etc. are technical – only technical – disciplines of the art, which is unitary and corresponds to the unity of the concrete and that of adequate thinking. It is what we could call a monism of knowledge and a polymorphism of expression.

Generally, technique differs from science even when based on it, by its character, which is closer to the concrete, by the necessity of a minimum of effective knowledge, of concrete thinking (knowing the place of applying it, sometimes the concrete monograph of the place of application). Within the same chapter of technique one can also notice the role of formulaic depot for past experiences which part of science represents.

As to the dialectic group, geometry, for instance, they are only sciences when considered as concrete data, when they are concrete figures and are considered as such, which is very rare. Mathematics has the benefit of the scientific prestige of physics and scientific technique, and thus it can be taken into consideration only as it can be used as graphic inscription of physical and vital functions. In this way, as one cannot consider it as adequate thinking, one can not talk here about science, be it mathematics, metaphysics or logic, i.e. any of the tautonymic sciences.]

(A. B.)

NOTES

1. "Mind" in Greek. Note of the translator
2. French in the original, "enclosures", "casings". Note of the translator.
3. "Use". French in the original. Note of the translator.