

The long life of A. Dumitriu can be divided into three research periods. The first one (1933-1948) was dedicated mostly to the philosophy of (mainly physical) sciences; the second (1954-1973), to logic and its relation with mathematics; and the third (1974-1990), to the search for a human ideal and to the role of science and philosophy in finding and achieving this ideal. Certainly, he was intensely interested in logic during the first period too, but his books on this subject were mainly expository. Therefore, it is not by sheer chance that the author revised them later, enlarging and updating them, and — most importantly — adding personal critical interpretations.

There is a constant corpus of ideas throughout his activity, which we could reduce to the following principles: 1) the tautological aspect of logical-mathematical reasoning; 2) the role of intellectual intuition in devising scientific theories; 3) the ontological-existential nature of knowledge. Each period is characterized by the emphasis laid on one of these principles (in the given order) and by the different meaning the whole construction acquires as a result of this emphasis.

On the other hand, A. Dumitriu preserved an ideal of absolute and definitive knowledge, distinguishable in all his works (except *Orient and Occident*, revised and enlarged in [19], after 44 years). He compared his image of the real science with this ideal, and his value judgments followed from here.

Thus, during the first period, accepting the neo-positivistic perspective (of R. Carnap, mainly), if combined with the more realistic one of E. Meyerson, he concludes that the only thing science does is to replace one enigma with another, more distant one. In the absence of a certain basis, scientific knowledge is fictitious, and the continuity in the succession of scientific theories (according to Th. Kuhn, we would now call them scientific paradigms) is only apparent, as they have in common facts only (their interpretations being completely different). Hence, he reaches gnosiological skepticism, because science would ultimately be the mere “art of creating symbols of our own power” (or thirst for power) — an illusory power, like the science it is based on. It is strange that there should be no technical-pragmatic criterion here that could prove that the powers of science are not mere ambitions, even if not absolute.

At his second stage, A. Dumitriu finds support in Aristotle's doctrine of the two intellects and of the foundation of science on the active intellect's intuition of the first principles (without considering it necessary to also accept Aristotle's “metaphysical” outlook). Starting from here, he makes a critical analysis of the formalism in contemporary mathematics and logic, allegedly guilty of having eliminated (in fact, having tried to eliminate, for it has not succeeded eventually) significations and having lost contact with the reality of mathematical and scientific creation.

Finally, towards the end of his life, following in Heidegger's footsteps, the logician accused the contemporary European civilization of losing the genuine sense of philosophy

and truth, as well as of lacking the concept of the ideal man, such as the sage (*sophos*) in the Greek antiquity, and the saint and the knight in the Middle Ages.

By accepting the Aristotelian "metaphysics" of identifying the thinker with the thought in the act of intuiting the first principles (of a divine nature), he now comes to the idea of an original philosophy of the miracle [14], and of the truth as un-forgetting (*a-letheia*), similar to the Platonic myth of remembering [16]. Apparently dissatisfied with the human ideal proposed by Aristotle's ethics, he looks for support in Socrates and the Pre-Socratics (and for confirmation, in the oriental philosophies) in order to understand the sage who becomes one with the universe and achieves the Being through purification, asceticism and self-knowledge [20].

The breach between the first and the second period was the result of the tragic experience of forced confinement between 1949-1954, which provided perhaps a propitious environment for certain pre-existent tendencies. They can be spotted in the interest he showed in [4] in the focus on man of the oriental philosophies and in his subsequent accusations against neo-positivism and its tendency towards pure objectivism. The second stage, where one can notice his search for a balanced position between objectivism and subjectivism (the last-illustrated, in his opinion, by Kant and Husserl), is the most productive in terms of books and the most durable in terms of results. They were published at the end of ten years of silence and intense elaboration. The work **Theory and System** belongs to this stage in his evolution and contains the quintessence of his position.

In brief, his achievements in this period are the following: 1) he explained and solved the logical-mathematical paradoxes in the spirit of classical logic; 2) he pointed out the dual nature of mathematics as the art of demonstration and invention at the same time; 3) he revealed the theoretical (not deductive) character of logic, which is the expression of the principles of thinking, known by intellectual intuition.

During the first period, science seems to A. Dumitriu to have an aesthetic character, due to the researcher's total involvement (including his unconscious tendencies). At this stage, mathematics appears to him similar to poetry (itself a combination of imposed rules and free creation), both based on imagination (as the ability to think by analogy) and intuition, except that in mathematics intuitions are necessary, while in poetry they are only sufficient.

If in [13], "the thinking of thinking" (which is allegedly achieved when the active intellect intuits the first principles, just like syllogism is allegedly the doing of the passive intellect) seems to him possible, in [16], which belongs to the last stage of his activity, the author admits that this would lead to a circle, and that one can only analyze the expression of thinking, subsequent to intuition (which is in accord with "the postulate of the act", stated by Camil Petrescu).

In his outlook on science, which A. Dumitriu borrows from Aristotle and seems to consider correct and relatively complete, there is no reference to experiment, which introduces new intuitions, certitudes and footing in the series of reasoning starting from primary truths, so that the deductive science is not left like an unfinished bridge, supported only at one end. In mathematics, the logician had recognized the outer world as a possible source of inspiration by analogy, for the objects created by the mathematician. Would this be the result of just the activity of the abstractive passive intellect, influenced only by sensations and incapable of intuitions? How do the two intellects succeed in cooperating in reasoning? It seems

more natural to suppose that they are only two complementary aspects of the same reality (the unitary intellect, intuitive and sensitive at the same time), that intuition can have as object things too, not just thinking, and that it is multiple, not unique.

The essay on Ulysses belongs to the last period too. It was published in [15], as a part of that "archaeology of Greek culture" A. Dumitriu was theorizing on and tried to carry out in [14], [16] and [20]. He tries to figure out the meaning of man's freedom and destiny before the Greek tragedians, as revealed in Homer's epic poem. He had manifested his interest on this topic much earlier. In [10], he showed that mathematical activity is a combination of necessity (given by the texture of syllogistic reasoning) and freedom (manifested in creating mathematical objects, in the possibility to select them from all the possible — i.e. non-contradictory — ones). In [2], he discerned (as a result of the existence of various sciences having different domains) a hierarchy of different types of determinism, with various degrees of freedom, that would allow the evolution of the universe. Here, Ulysses' destiny is seen as made, like a fabric, of a fixed "warp" and a variable "woof", that can be changed in certain conditions — an outlook which, like that of the Greek tragedy authors (as revealed by A. Voinescu), is closer to modern ideas than to the rigid Calvinistic predestination.

Ulysses seems to the philosopher an example of that wise "truth holder" (*sophos*) whom he intended to advance as a human ideal for the modern European civilization. It is odd that the author should not have noticed that this civilization does have a human ideal: the creative genius.

Ulysses, whom the Greeks viewed more like a hero (the Greeks' first human ideal, like the knight and the saint in the Middle Ages), "the one with many ways of thinking", as A. Dumitriu interprets it, could therefore be considered "ingenious", and consequently seen as a predecessor of the modern genius. What Europe lacks is not an ideal, but perhaps (in the absence of God), an absolute assessment criterion (which Camil Petrescu found in the realm of substantialization). Hence, the lack of a canonical hierarchy of geniuses (like that of the saints), the unexpected appearance of new ones and the permanent questioning of the already accepted ones (of which even the Christian Middle Ages had its share).

A. Dumitriu had found in *hesycheia* (anchoretism) the closest embodiment of the enlightened archaic wisdom, but as he could not suggest it to his contemporaries, he recommended them to cultivate mathematics, music and "the asceticism of culture", which he followed. This way led him to the superb beauty in which he ended his life.

(L. B.)

